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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
YOSIF B. ABDULKADIR, and PAMELA SUSAN ABDULKADIR, an infant, and PATRICIA FATIN ABDULKADIR, an infant, by Yosif B.
ABDULKADIR, their Guardian, Ad
Litem,
Plaintiffs and App,ellants,

Case No.
8677

vs.
THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This suit was commenced April 14, 1956, to recover
damages for the death of LaMay R. Abdulkadir. Extensive
pretrial discovery was employed by counsel for both parties
including the taking of depositions of all known witnesses
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and a series of written interrogatories. Approximately one
year after the action was filed, the case was submitted to
the trial court on the motion of defendant for summary
judgment. The trial judge heard arguments of counsel,
took the matter under advisement, and on the 20th day of
April, 1957, entered an order granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment. This appeal followed. "R" refers
to pages of the depositions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident out of which this suit arose occurred on
the defendant's main line track at approximately 11 :40
p. m. on the 18th day of July, 1955. The atmosphere was
clear. At the point of the accident, defendant's main line
running east and west is paralleled on the north by a siding
track. The main line from this point is paralleled by U. S.
Highway 40 for several miles to the east and to the west.
There is a narrow abandoned roadway approximately eight
feet in width crossing defendant's tracks at the point where
plaintiff's intestate was struck. The only structure in the
vicinity of the crossing is a small wooden building located
south of the track. Persons approaching the old road crossing, as plaintiff and his wife were doing on the fatal night,
have an unobstructed view up and down the track for many
miles. The diagram attached as Exhibit "A" which has been
prepared from the testimony and admitted facts accurately
reflects the physical surroundings of the accident site.
Shortly before the accident, plaintiff had been proceeding west on Highway 40 towards Wendover. In order to
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get off of the traveled portion of the highway to change
a tire, he pulled his automobile onto the side road to the
south of the highway and stopped with the front of the
automobile facing defendant's tracks and approximately
66 feet north of the siding track. After the tire had been
changed, it became necessary for plaintiff's wife to relieve
herself and in order to secure privacy and shelter the two
decided to proceed south along the abandoned road across
the tracks. Before starting out, plaintiff testified that he
turned on the high beam of his headlights which cast a beam
of light down the old roadway and across the tracks (R.
16). Upon leaving the car plaintiff could see the passing
track and told his wife that they would have to cross a railroad track (R. 17). Upon crossing the siding track, plaintiff and his wife noticed the main line (R. 19). It was
plaintiff's testimony that he and his wife before crossing
the main line were "noticing both sides to see if the train
was coming" (R. 19) but failed to see or hear the approaching train (R. 19, 23, 24). Plaintiff's intestate was following one step behind him and a little to the right (R. 23).
When plaintiff was between the tracks on the main line,
he looked up, saw the light of the train, yelled to his wife,
and made a single jump to safety (R. 22, 23). His wife,
however, was struck and killed before she could reach the
south side of the track. Plaintiff referred to the light on
the train as "a very strong light" (R. 24) about 6 feet off
of the ground (R. 25) which he saw for the first time only
a few feet from him (R. 24, 25) .
I

Following the accident, plaintiff went to the head of
the train and observed the light which he described as a
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"very bright light," (R. 50) and he thought that the engineer had forgotten to switch from the high to the low beam
when the train was brought to a stop (R. 49-52).
The only known witnesses to the accident are plaintiff,
Mr. Abdulkadir; the engineer, Mr. Harry Fuller, and the
fireman, Mr. Sam Steele, Jr. The fireman and engineer
were in the cab of the train at the time of the collision.
Depositions of each of these three men were taken and filed
with the court.
It appears from defendant's evidence that just prior
to the accident the train was traveling 79 miles per hour
(R. 63). The engineer and fireman based their statement
as to speed on observance of the speed recorder in the cab
of the engine and a speed tape permanently recording the
speed of the train. Plaintiff estimated the speed of the
train to be 90 miles per hour from the sound of the wheels
as it passed him (R. 36). A whistle was sounded as the
train approached, approximately a mile or 3,4 of a mile
distant (R. 66). The light of the train was on full beam
and cast light down the track in front of the train about
800 feet (R. 68). Despite the unobstructed view up the
track, plaintiff failed to see the light until the train was
upon him (R. 34).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE
TRIED BY A JURY.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT DENIED ANY OF
THEIR RIGHTS BY THE ENTRY OF THE
JUDGMENT BELOW.

POINT IV
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY, COMPELS
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DECEASED
WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. THERE
WAS, THEREFORE, NO GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE
TRIED BY A JURY.
Plaintiff asserts that he has been denied his constitutional right of trial by jury and that Rule 39, U. R. C. P.
has not been complied with. There is no constitutional right
to trial by jury in a civil case. Rule 39 provides for trial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

of issues of fact by a jury upon proper demand. The trial
court by its order granting the motion for summary judgment found that there were no material issues of fact to
be tried. The only issue on this appeal is whether or not,
in view of the admitted facts, there was a genuine issue of
material fact to be tried by a jury. This is discussed under
Point IV infra.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Plaintiff urges that defendant was not entited to judgment because the Complaint states a cause of action and
plaintiff has not admitted contributory negligence. Defendant's position is, and the court found, that the depositions
and other papers on file conclusively show, that the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. If this is true, none of the other prospective issues in
the lawsuit are material. This simply emphasizes the point
heretofore made that the only genuine issue on this appeal
is whether or not the trial court properly found. that there
was no genuine issue of material fact. We submit that the
trial judge properly decided the motion under Rule 56 which
provides that:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on
file, together vvith the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judg·ment as a
matter of law."
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POINT III
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT DENIED ANY OF
THEIR RIGHTS BY THE ENTRY OF THE
JUDGMENT BELOW.
Unless there was some material issue of fact to be tried,
plaintiffs had no right to require the time and expense of
a trial. It is enough to say that the question of contributory
negligence is conclusively resolved by the testimony of plaintiff himself.
Plaintiff asserts that considerable effort has been made
to locate a certain witness who it is claimed was on the
scene at the time of the accident. Although it has been over
two years since the occurrence of the accident, plaintiff
has had no success with his· attempt to locate this witness.
No offer has been made to show what the testimony of
this witness would be. It is obvious, however, that no living
person was in a better position to see and hear what happened than was plaintiff who was only a step away from
deceased when she was killed.
The depositions of defendant's employees gave an account of the accident very similar to that given by plaintiff.
There is no substantial dispute of fact so far as the issue of
contributory negligence is concerned. Insofar as there may
be a dispute, plaintiff's version will be accepted for purposes of considering the propriety of the court's ruling.

POINT IV
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE, INCLUDING
PLAINTIFF'S OWN TESTIMONY, COMPELS
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THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DECEASED
WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. THERE
WAS, THEREFORE, NO GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED BY A JURY.
If, as the court found, the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the motion for
summary judgment was properly granted. Contributory
negligence is a complete defense in this jurisdiction available against the heirs in a wrongful death suit. Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 112 Utah 189,
186 P. 2d 293, Reh. 112 Utah 218, 189 P. 2d 701. If the defense is established as a matter of law, as it was in the case
at bar, the other issues (negligence and damages) are not
material.
In the instant case the testimony of all known eye
witnesses was taken by deposition and published at the
hearing on defendant's motion. The important facts bearing on the issue of contributory negligence came from the
mouth of plaintiff himself who was closest on the scene of
any person now living. We think this evidence clearly shows
that the deceased failed to exercise that degree of care
required for her own safety in crossing defendant's tracks.
The following facts are established by the testimony
of plaintiff himself: The accident occurred at the intersection of a narrow unused dirt road with defendant's main
line track. The trackage at the point of the accident and
for several miles in either direction traverses isolated and
desolate desert-like country. It was approximately 11 :30
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p. m. in the summer evening of July 18, 1955. The atmosphere was clear and there was no obstruction to vision
either up or down the track, the only limiting factor being
the d~rkness of the night. Plaintiff and the deceased had
decided to traverse the track by foot to find some privacy
from the highway. Before setting out to cross the tracks,
plaintiff had turned on his automobile lights. Both he and
his wife knew that they would have to cross railroad tracks
to reach a position of privacy. Plaintiff was constantly
watching both up and down the tracks before crossing the
passing track. After the passing track had been traversed,
plaintiff and deceased noticed the main line track (R. 19)
and before attempting to cross the main line, the two were
"noticing both sides to see if the train was coming" (R.
19). Plaintiff made it across the main line track but deceased did not.
Plaintiff's own evidence establishes that the train had
a very bright light on front (R. 24, 49, 52). Defendant's
witness testified that the beam of the headlight illuminated
the track ahead for about 800 feet (R. 68). Plaintiff estimated that he could see a lighted train a half-mile away
(R. 33) . Despite the unobstructed view up the track, plaintiff and deceased failed to see the lighted train until it was
upon them; nor did they hear the huge locomotive with its
many cars (R. 19, 23, 24). The train was traveling at. the
usual high speed at which trains are propelled in isolated
territory. From the foregoing it seems to us manifest that
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and that the motion was properly granted by the
trial judge.
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The law pertaining to the duty of a traveler at railroad
crossings is well defined in the decisions of our own Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to refer, as plaintiff has
repeatedly done, to the summation of general law contained
in American Jurisprudence. In Wilkinson v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 35 Utah 100, 116, 99 Pac. 466, 468, the duty
of a traveler in crossing railroad tracks was defined as
follows:
"The requirements of the law * * * proceed beyond the featureless generality that one must
do his duty in this respect, or must exercise ordinary
care under the circumstances. The law defines precisely what the term 'ordinary care under the circumstances' shall mean in these cases. In the progress of the law in this behalf the question of care
at railway crossings, as affecting the traveler, is no
longer, as a rule, a question for the jury. The quantum of care is exactly prescribed as a matter of law.
In attempting to cross the traveler must listen for
signals, notice signs put up as warnings, and look
attentively up and down the track * * * " (Emphasis added.)
One of the required precautions applicable to the instant case is defined by the court in the Wilkinson opinion
as follows:
"If a traveler, by looking, could have seen an
app?"oaching train 1~n time to escape, it will be presumed in case he is infnred by coUision, either that
he did not look o1·, if he did look, that he did not heed
'luhat he san,. Such conduct is held negligence per
se." (Emphasis added.)
Numerous cases affirm the rule set forth in the Wilkinson case, supra, to the effect that a traveler who had an
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opportunity to discover an approaching train in time to
avoid an accident and who fails to do so, is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law: See e. g., Butler
v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 Pac. 869; Drummond v. Union
Pacific R. R. Co., 14 Utah 289, 117 P. 2d 903, Haarstrich v.
0. S. L. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100; Nuttall v. Denver
and Rio Grande Western R. Co., 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15;
Benson v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co.,
... Utah ... , 286 P. 2d 790. In each of the cases above cited
it was held as a matter of law that the traveler in failing
to see what was there to be seen was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law.
It also seems apparent that the time when the traveler
is required to look is when he is about to cross the tracks.
Our high court noted in Drummond v. Union Pacific R. R.
Co._, 14 Utah 289, 117 P. 2d 903, (1947) that:
"The time to look is when he is about to cross.
That is the time when he is about to encounter the
danger portended by a railroad crossing, and it is
not enough that he look at a point some distance
from the crossing, when looking on nearer approach
would reveal danger."
These propositions of law pose the following question:
Could the deceased have seen defendant's locomotive had
she looked attentively up the main track as she was about
to cross it? The evidence compels a decisive affirmative
answer. It would be simply incredible to suppose that a
person in deceased's position would be unable, had she
looked as she neared the crossing, to observe the approach
of a huge lighted locomotive pulling a train of 13 cars, and
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yet be struck by the train as she took her first step onto
the track. Such a proposition would defy all known human
experience. We submit that, as was said in the Holmgren
case, supra,
"The conclusion is irresistible that [deceased]
either failed to look or having looked, failed to heed
what [s]he saw or should have· seen [S]he must,
therefore, be held to have be·en guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law."
The facts of this case are very similar to those in Mingus
v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 495, where the deceased
walked from the sidewalk into a street at nighttime and
was struck and killed by an automobile. The court said
in that case:
"More convincing than the direct testimony that
deceased did not look, is the further evidence that
deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate
that he was at all aware of the danger presented
by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems
to have been wholly unaware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing either to warn his wife, or
to rescue either himself or her from their position
of peril. On this evidence, it must be said as a matter of law that deceased either failed to look, or having looked, failed to see what he should have seen."
It also seems to us manifest that deceased failed to
listen for the approach of a train as she neared the crossing. The locomotive 'vhich struck her was pulling a train
of twelve to thirteen cars (R. 72). As the train passed
plaintiff it made a great deal of noise (R. 35) . A pedestrian
has a better opportunity to hear and to see approaching
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trains and to prevent a collision than the ordinary motorist
who sits in an automobile with the engine running and must
look up and down the track from within his vehicle. If
plaintiff had been listening for trains as she approached
the crossing, it seems manifest to us that she could have
heard the noise of defendant's locomotive before she was
struck.
Plaintiff does not seriously argue that deceased could
not have seen the train had she looked, for the train was
there to be seen and deceased was in a position to see it.
Mr. Abdulkadir's testimony conclusively shows that the
lighted locomotive could have been seen had deceased looked
(R. 33). Plaintiff's position is that deceased did not have
a duty to look as she crossed the tracks because she was
being led across by her husband who walked ahead of her.
It is urged that she had the same duty of care for her own
safety as would a guest in an automobile. No cases are cited
in support of this unique proposition and, of course, none
can be found. If such a proposition were accepted, it might
also be suggested that the driver of one automobile could
rely upon the driver of another to lead him safely across
railroad tracks. It is axiomatic in our law that an adult
pedestrian having the normal faculties has no right to rely
upon another to safely lead him or her across streets or
across railroad tracks. Each person has a duty to exercise
care for his own safety and when, as in the instant case,
the traveler has full control of the situation, he must exercise certain minimum precautions before stepping onto a
railroad track. Plaintiff's urge that what is reasonable care
under the circumstances is for the jury. As pointed out
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in the foregoing cases, however, the law has defined in this
area exactly what the traveler must do to comply with the
standard. One of those requirements is that the traveler
must look and listen for trains at a railroad crossing and
see what is to be seen.
Further, as a demurrer to the negligence of deceased,
a halfway attempt is made by plaintiff to urge the doctrine
of last clear chance. Last clear chance was not pleaded and
none of the elements of the doctrine are present in the instant case. Only a portion of the doctrine is quoted. The
third element of § 480 of the Restatement which is very
significant in this case has been omitted by plaintiff's
counsel in the quote from the Holmgren case. This is simply
a case of a woman stepping directly into the path of an oncoming train. It is clear from the language of § 480, and
the cases interpreting it, that the doctrine has no application to such facts. Cox v. Thompson, ... Utah ... , 254 P.
2d 1047; Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. Co., 112 Utah
189, 186 p. 2d 293.
The single Utah decision cited and relied upon by
plaintiff is Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Co., 121
Utah 37, 239 P. 2d 163. In that case the view of the traveler
was obstructed by a freight train standing on parallel tracks
pulling 65 cars, emitting steam and blowing a whistle. The
defendant's streamliner was traveling twice the permitted
speed in a busy station yard. It was snowing "quite hard"
and independent eye witnesses definately established that
the streamliner could not be seen until it was on the crossing. The only similarity in the facts of the two cases is that
there was more than one set of railroad tracks in each case.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's own testimony clearly shows that the deceased failed to look and to listen before stepping onto defendant's tracks or failed to heed what was there to be seen
and heard. We submit that the trial court properly dismissed the Complaint and that the decision below should
be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully Submitted,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,

Attorneys for Defendant
& Respondent.
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